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The thrive for corporate accountability has given rise to some of the most vivid
legal developments since the post-war era. In a liberal logic and from the vantage
point of the rule of law, these have generally been championed. Pioneering cases
against industrialists in the Nuremberg war criminal trials, a surge of civil liability
claims brought against lead firms in the Global North, the recent openness of the
European Commission towards a European due diligence initiative—each of the
pieces of the puzzle of corporate accountability came after public campaigns and
require some conceptual adjustment in the law’s architecture. Taken together, they
purport to illustrate that ‘rights violations’ in the global economy should not remain
unsanctioned. It is via the deterrence effects of liability that Ruggie’s well-ordered
paradigm of embedded liberalism shall be extended globally.
Grietje Baars in their book ‘The Corporation, Law and Capitalism’ (Brill, 2019) makes
the astute claim that corporate accountability not only falls short of its ambitions, but
that it is even captured by and inevitably nourishes a capitalist logic. The argument
instantly resonates with Boltanski and Chiapello in their ‘New Spirit of Capitalism’,
diagnosing that capitalism subliminally recycles and incorporates what aims at
is overcoming. Baars, however, treats corporate accountability as a genuinely
legal project and grounds its futility in a sweeping historical-materialist narrative
of the symbiosis of law and capital ever since the emergence of the business
corporation. Baars unfolds their argument from a decidedly (neo-)Marxist perspective
drawing on the commodity theory of the legal form as formulated by Pashukanis and
employed by a growing related line of thought in international law. The legal coding
of capitalism materializes not only at the substantive level of singular legal acts but
more fundamentally at the level of the legal form.
Going back to the colonial Dutch and British East India Companies, law was
characterized by a careful division of labor between private and public international
law to facilitate largely unhampered commerce. The profit-seeking programming
of the corporation structurally prevails over states’ regulatory leverage when
political institutions are unwilling—or deliberately restrict themselves, as is the
case under investment law. A lacking sensitivity for economic power as manifested
in the institutions which arise from the use of legal freedoms such as markets or
production chains, runs through legal history until today. It has not even been on
top of the agenda of the critical movement, which has been chiefly preoccupied
with laying bare how political power transforms into law. This only changed recently
in cross-disciplinary approaches that are brought together under the umbrella of
‘transnational law’ and connect macro- with anthropologically informed micro-level
analysis.
Uniform vs janus-headed legal form
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Importantly, in Baars’ account, the legal form becomes pervasive both in the
inner workings of the law and beyond, namely as a legal ideology sustaining
preconceptions of power and telos of the state and the role of business in society. As
Marx found in his critique of human rights, law then desolidarizes and fosters agony
while putting a spoke in the wheel of struggles for social justice. Consequently, in
Baars’ view, law (both as an institution and a specific legal act) cannot form part of
a solution—the way to overcome capitalism includes overcoming law as its intimate
ally. What is more, because of law’s form, lawmakers, lawyers and lay users cannot
but process the legal code of capitalism in its systemic biases and become coopted.
While certainly true for certain legal fields and already observed by Weber’s account
of legal clerks and jurists, it seems doubtful if the legal form can be reduced to
a specific rationale. Under the premise of an essentializing conception of both
capitalism and the legal form, the work of legal activist and strategic litigants for
instance would appear in new light, both practically and analytically. Theirs then
would seem like a fight against windmills, even egoistic since counterproductive
at the outset on the macro-level. The history of rights movements tells a different
story and suggests law can at least attempt to strip off even intense expressions of
hegemony. This narrows down the question: Under what circumstances then can
such legal struggles, eclectic and limited as they may be, have positive effects? The
legal form, in other words, appears as more fluid and ambivalent, both curtailing and
facilitating emancipatory change, particularly by enabling societal and normative
pluralism. Transformation, not to say revolution, through law is not unthinkable,
just that their legal surface will highlight continuation and persistence over rupture.
More radically, Menke has recently invited to imagine a ‘revolution of the legal
form’ as an inward turn to the political in law’s processes and operations. Just like
Benjamin’s Critique of Violence only seemingly advocated the abrogation of law
—while actually suggesting its liberation—this suggests that ‘legal form’ is not an
exogenous constant, but an evolving medium of social practice. As much as law
serves as repository of past societal experience and thereby restricts our possibilities
of voicing societal change, the form of law is dynamic and inherently pluralistic.
For Kelsen, in his critique of Pashukanis, this suggested to not equate a pre-legal
understanding of property with the law of property but rather assume its constructive
nature and democratic design.
The legal form of value chain capitalism
Besides the legal form, also patterns of capitalism are highly dynamic, the most
recent emanations being global value chains and digital platforms. Both examples,
industrial and digital chains, provide clear illustrations of the co-constitutive nature
of capitalism and law.  Value chains unfold in an overall legal architecture that
is irreducible to specific doctrines of a single field, such as corporate law. As
anthropologist Anna Tsing pointed out, the animating logics of global value chains
are difference and heterogeneity between states, regulations, and identities, not a
comprehensive and stable idea of capitalism. Law forms part of constructing these
differences on multiple levels, from the fine-grained rules of contractual liability to
the large-scale determinants of preferential trading areas. Baars rightly highlights
the blind spot of the contemporary ‘business and human rights’ initiatives, namely
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to generate norms to hold lead firms accountable while leaving unaffected those
norms that induce rights violations in the first place. Accountability and change in
value chains hinge upon the technicalities of the enabling structures of private law
predominantly. The rhetoric and doctrines of human rights often fall short of making
a difference at the level of technicalities ‘deep down’ in private law. Ultimately,
this shows the constructive effort necessary to implement calls to ‘end impunity’ in
the field of value chain wrongs. While the history of international criminal law was
dependent primarily on political will, the trajectory of value chain accountability raises
basic questions of attributability and legal doctrine: What are the boundaries of a
corporate actor and its sphere of responsibility? What role do lead firms’ knowledge
or purposeful ignorance of rights violations along the chain play? These are central
tropes in a nascent and highly dynamic ‘law of global supply chains’.
Grietje Baars’ book breaks new ground in tracing and disenchanting corporate
accountability through numerous contemporary discourses. With elegance and
rigor, the author connects the dots between business and human rights, corporate
social responsibility (CSR) and corporate complicity in criminal law to provide an
immensely thought-provoking and internally persuasive argument that takes the
reader to the forefront of Marxist scholarship on international law.
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